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Besides costs and benefits, fairness aspects tend to influence negotiating parties’ willingness 
to join an international agreement on climate change mitigation. Fairness is largely 
considered to improve the prospects of success of international negotiations and hence 
measures raising fairness perception might – in turn – help to bring about effective 
cooperative international climate change mitigation. We consider the influences present 
international support of climate policy in developing countries exerts on fairness perception 
and how this again might affect international negotiations. In doing so, we distinguish 
between fairness perception which is based on historical experiences and perception which is 
based on conjectures about opponents’ intentions. By identifying beneficial components of 
current support schemes, lessons can be learnt for designing new schemes like the Green 
Climate Fund. 
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Fairness plays a role in diverse international policy arenas addressing transnational market 
failures. In these arenas, voluntary coordination between individual states is necessary for 
attaining a Pareto optimal allocation, since there is no coercive international authority that 
can enforce efficiency generating measures. Prominent examples of such arenas are the fields 
of international trade (see, e.g. Stiglitz 2000, Suranovic 2000, Davidson, Matusz and Nelson 
2006), and the provision of global public goods like climate protection (see, e.g. Albin 2003, 
Buchholz and Peters 2007, Tavoni et al. 2011) or the management of international public 
bads like financial instability (see, e.g. Wyplosz 1999, Gabriele, Boratav and Parikh 2000). 
Our interest is closely related to the field of sub-optimal low provision of global public 
goods, and we investigate how international finance may support the provision level of global 
public goods via influencing fairness perception in individual countries. More specifically, 
we consider the international support of developing countries in climate change mitigation 
and adaptation.
1  
International climate finance has recently experienced a strong push. At the 16
th Conference 
of Parties (COP) to the United Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 
Cancun in 2010, it was pledged to mobilize $100 billion in international climate financing 
annually by 2020. These public and private funds are dedicated to mitigation and adaptation 
projects in developing countries. Since it was also agreed that adaptation “must be addressed 
with the same priority as mitigation” (UNFCCC 2011), it is conceivable to assume that a 
large share of the $100-billion pledge will be assigned to adaptation support. A significant 
share of new multilateral funding for adaptation is planned to flow through the Green Climate 
Fund, whose creation was also agreed upon in Cancun. Preparations for the Green Climate 
Fund are currently underway and intense debates about the appropriate design of strategies 
and involved mechanisms are taking place. The vision for long-term cooperative action with 
respect to global warming that was stipulated in Cancun is explicitly put on the basis of 
equity and of accordance with common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities (UNFCCC 2011).
2 Yet, there exist different equity and justice principles which 
                                                            
1 While mitigation is a global public good, adaptation is in most cases a kind of ‘private good’ from the 
perspective of a whole country conducting adaptation, since the associated benefits tend to be mainly local or 
regional (Stern 2007: 406). Or as Barrett (2008: 254) puts it, “[i]n contrast to mitigation, the benefits of 
adaptation are excludable” from an individual country’s point of view. Hence, international support of these two 
climate policy options (adaptation and mitigation) induces diverse effects of different degrees of publicness. 
2 Hepburn and Müller (2010) propose to implement a levy on international air passengers in order to raise funds 
for international adaptation finance and argue that it has the “equity benefit of focusing purely on (individual) 
responsibility and capability” (Hepburn and Müller 2010: 837). 3 
 
could be applied in global warming policy (see Kverndokk and Rose 2008) and 
internationally there is no unanimous agreement about the appropriate principle. According to 
Lange, Vogt and Ziegler (2007), who conducted an empirical analysis based on data from a 
world-wide survey of people involved in climate policy, the polluter-pays rule and the 
accompanying poor losers rule are the most widely accepted equity principles. Depending on 
whether an international climate policy or strategy serves an individual country’s idea of 
equity or justice, this country will regard the respective policy or strategy as either fair or 
unfair. Fairness, in turn, tends to affect agents’ conduct (see, e.g. Bolton 1991, Rabin 1993, 
1998, Fehr and Gächter 2000 and Falk and Fischbacher 2006), but the channels, ways and 
degrees of its influence are ambiguous and highly disputed.  
A large strand of the climate-policy related fairness literature deals with distributive fairness 
aspects involved in climate change mitigation policy. Ringius, Torvanger and Underdal 
(2002) investigate burden sharing proposals in international negotiations on climate change 
and discuss their distributive fairness properties. Different approaches for the design of 
burden sharing schemes, e.g. based on carbon intensity or historical responsibility concepts, 
reflect different social understandings of fairness and “[t]hese different perceptions of 
fairness are shaped to a large extent by the highly disparate positions that countries occupy in 
the global hierarchy of economic and political power” (Parks and Roberts 2008: 624). Rive, 
Torvanger and Fuglestvedt (2006) investigate historical responsibility for global warming as 
a criterion for the distribution of mitigation requirements in future climate agreements and 
they identify fairness principles as a factor – in turn – influencing the design of historical 
responsibility schemes. As Rabin (1993: 1284) remarks, although agents’ decisions are 
influenced by fairness considerations, people tend not to “be as willing to sacrifice a great 
amount of money to maintain fairness as they would be with small amounts of money”.
3 Such 
a potential conflict of objectives between fairness and self-interest has also been referred to 
by Hammar and Jagers (2007), who investigate distributive fairness aspects of carbon 
taxation. Hence, it is ambiguous to which extent fairness aspects indeed influence the 
behavior of policymakers in international climate policy, since material wellbeing of 
countries is affected to a big extent in this policy arena. Lange et al. (2010) argue that 
although equity arguments may be perceived as being used out of fairness considerations, 
                                                            
3 Akerlof (1979: 233) considers the trade-off between fairness and profits in the labour market and points out 
that “while wage policy cannot totally disregard markets, because some wage policies would be too costly for 
the firm to pursue, there is nevertheless a range of possible standard business practices, that, once expected to be 
followed and considered to be ethically correct, will prove themselves too costly to violate.” 4 
 
equity principles in international climate negotiations are mostly correlated with the self-
interest of the negotiating parties. However, a recent study by Carlsson et al. (2011) on 
ingroup bias, i.e. on whether preferences for effort-sharing rules for reducing carbon dioxide 
emissions are based only on the rules per se or whether they are confounded with personal 
preferences for individual countries, finds that ingroup bias is less of a problem.  
Besides such studies on fairness of effort sharing in climate change mitigation, there has been 
research on fairness related to other aspects like fairness in adaptation and procedural 
fairness. Principles for fair adaptation to climate change have been discussed, e.g. Paavola 
and Adger (2006) and Grasso (2007). Grasso (2010) develops a framework of procedural and 
distributive justice tailored to international funding of adaptation to climate change. Rübbelke 
(2011) considers procedural and distributive aspects of fairness involved in international 
mitigation and adaptation policy and investigates in a game-theoretic setting the potential role 
of fairness for the attainment of an effective international agreement on climate protection. 
Mainly variations of historical fairness perceptions via increases in international adaptation 
support are in the focus of his study. 
The present study neither discusses fairness of effort sharing schemes in climate change 
mitigation, nor does it generate a framework for ‘fair’ adaptation to climate change. Instead, 
our focus is on the subarea of international support of climate policy: we analyze the 
potential role of present international support of mitigation and adaptation projects in 
developing countries in raising fairness perception. We investigate how induced fairness 
effects might in turn influence international negotiations on climate change mitigation. In 
contrast to Rübbelke (2011), we explicitly consider changes also in the level of intention 
driven fairness, i.e. the fairness assigned to other agents on the basis of both these agents’ 
motives and choices (see Rabin 1993 for such intentionality in attitudes about fairness), in a 
game-theoretic setting and not only modifications in consequence driven fairness perception, 
i.e. fairness perception based on the (expected) consequences of agents’ behavior in the past. 
This allows a more precise elaboration of the interrelations between the different applied 
fairness concepts (intention and consequence driven fairness). Furthermore, we consider and 
identify different channels for changing fairness perception in the current international 
support schemes. 
From this analysis we obtain insights about the adequate design of international support of 
developing countries’ climate policy (related to both mitigation of and adaptation to climate 
change) for enhancing fairness perception and for bringing about more effective cooperative 5 
 
international climate change mitigation. From these results, lessons can be learnt for the 
appropriate design of international funds, like the Green Climate Fund.  
 
2.  Fairness Perception in Climate Policy 
The present rules of procedures at the COP to the UNFCCC stipulate that decisions are taken 
by consensus. Yet, as Müller (2010: 23) points out concerning the failure of the COP in 
Copenhagen in 2009, the problem “was what was seen to be the blatant disregard for these 
procedures and the resulting (strongly felt) disrespect that were at the root of the problem.” 
Several developing countries perceived some form of exclusion during the Copenhagen 
negotiation processes which turned out to raise the distrust these countries hold with respect 
to industrialized countries in international climate policy. Put it differently, they felt treated in 
an unfair way. 
As we will discuss, the influence of the perception of unfairness on international climate 
negotiations tends to be adverse. In doing so we distinguish between 1) intention driven 
fairness perception and 2) consequence driven fairness perception (see Rübbelke 2011). 
Thereafter, we will demonstrate how international support of climate policy in developing 
countries may help to improve fairness perception.  
The concepts of intention and consequence driven fairness we employ, are not fully 
congruent with the frequently discussed concepts of procedural and distributive fairness 
respectively. The literature on distributive and procedural fairness largely approaches the idea 
of fairness in a normative way weighing up different fairness principles, or as Kverndokk and 
Rose (2008: 139) explain, there are these two ways to justify why an action is good or bad 
from an ethical standpoint, i.e. ethically not only consequences matter, but also the process by 
which outcomes are reached. According to Grasso (2010: 75), procedural fairness of 
international adaptation funding regimes would require that all relevant parties are involved, 
for example. Different distributive fairness principles are outlined by Ringius, Torvanger and 
Underdal (2002: 4-11). The normative analysis might help to assign ‘fairness’ to specific 
procedures, sharing rules or outcomes. In contrast, intention driven fairness perception and 
consequence driven fairness perception concepts as used in this study just refer to the 
perceptions of fairness which are potentially held by policymakers in the negotiation process, 
but there is no attempt to justify any procedure, state or outcome from a normative point of 
view. Instead, the outcomes are negotiated in a decentralized way, but decision making is 6 
 
influenced by fairness perceptions held by individual policymakers. We do not evaluate 
whether the perceived (un-)fairness is justifiable from an ethic point of view.  
Intention driven fairness perception depends on beliefs about the other negotiating agents’ 
intentions in the present negotiation process or in current international climate policy in 
general. Already Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989) stressed the role of beliefs in 
game-theoretical contexts and in their framework, agents’ payoffs depend on both players’ 
beliefs and their actions. Based on this approach, Rabin (1993) developed the concept of 
kindness functions, which measure how kind an agent is to another. Unkind behavior of 
opponent parties generates fairness cost for a negotiating agent, while mutually kind behavior 
generates fairness benefits for the considered agent. By including fairness benefits or 
unfairness cost affecting an agent’s total payoffs (which in turn include both material and 
fairness payoffs), the perceived kindness of other agents influences a negotiating agent’s 
behavior. Hence, negotiating parties’ payoffs depend on both players’ beliefs (about other 
agents’ kindness) and their actions. Agents may prefer to sacrifice some of their material 
well-being for fairness reasons, i.e. either for helping those who are kind to them or for 
punishing those who are unkind (Rabin 1997: 1). This is in line with Lange, Vogt and Ziegler 
(2007: 546) who point out with respect to international climate change mitigation: “In a 
world where no single party will provide the common good in sufficient quantity and no 
institution exists to enforce cooperation, an agreement will only be accepted by the parties if 
it is assessed to be beneficial in terms of costs and benefits and if it is perceived to be fair”. 
Consequently, both economic efficiency and fairness are to be considered as prerequisites for 
attaining an effective international agreement on climate change.  
Yet, as Falk and Fischbacher (2006: 309) point out, “[k]indness comprises both the 
consequences as well as the intention of action”. So, consequences of activities executed by 
other agents before the present negotiations take place could also influence fairness 
perception, i.e. consequence driven (or historical) fairness perception, during the 
negotiations. Müller, Höhne and Ellermann (2009) argue that a fair burden sharing would 
have to be based on a combination of historical responsibility shares and some differentiated 
index of capability. Hence, responsibility for combating climate change is mainly assigned to 
the industrialized world whose greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have been a negative side-
effect of their economic development yielding prosperity (which makes them, in turn, more 
capable of combating global warming) and these emissions have predominantly caused the 
current global warming threat. Yet, as industrialized countries may argue, past economic 7 
 
development in industrialized countries has brought about technical progress from which also 
developing countries benefit and which now supports poor countries’ development. 
Consequently, taking into account different layers and aspects of the complex global 
warming problem, a ubiquitous principle ascertaining universal fairness does not exist in 
international climate policy. Nevertheless, negotiating parties hold their own views on 




It has often been stressed in the literature on international negotiations that negotiations on 
climate change mitigation can best be described as a chicken game situation (see, e.g. Carraro 
and Siniscalco 1993). Also, the game of chicken is taken to be “perhaps the ideal game for 
contrasting fairness and self-interested preferences” (Camerer 1997: 171). In the following, 
we will show in a chicken game setting how changes in negotiation pay-offs due to the 
consideration of intention and consequence fairness can affect the equilibrium strategies 
chosen by the negotiating parties. We will specifically focus on the potential of reducing 
unfairness to increase the likelihood of a cooperative outcome. 
According to Rabin (1993), the expected utility of an agent depends on his own strategy, on 
his beliefs about the strategy of the other agent and his believes about what the other agent 
believes about his strategies. To simplify the presentation, we follow, in a two-player chicken 
setting, a depiction of intention driven fairness adjustment proposed by Camerer and Thaler 
(2003). In contrast to their paper however, we express pay-offs in a more general way. 
Furthermore, we include consequence driven or historical fairness adjustment terms in order 
to illustrate possible interrelations between intention and consequence driven fairness aspects. 
In the game depicted in Figure 1, the two negotiating agents face the choice between 
participating or not participating in an international agreement on climate change mitigation. 
We assume one agent to be a rich industrialized region (subscript  ) and the other to be a 
poor developing region (subscript  ). The net material pay-offs of each region (benefits of 
climate policy minus the costs of taking action) are given by   ,   ,    and   ,     ,  . For a 
chicken game scenario to arise when no fairness are considered the following relations have 
to hold: 0         ,             ,0         ,             . 8 
 
Besides the material pay-offs we additionally consider the adjustments of pay-offs that arise 
from the feeling of being treated fairly or unfairly.   
   0  reflects the intensity of intention 
driven fairness in country i while   
   0  gives the intensity of consequence driven or 
historical fairness. An increase in fairness induces a decline of the respective  . For 
simplicity we assume that intention and consequence driven fairness adjustments can be 
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Figure 1: Negotiations on Climate Change Mitigation with Fairness-Adjusted Payoffs. 
 
3.1 Fairness Adjustments  
For each region, the impact of fairness adjustment on pay-offs depends on whether the region 
is developing or industrialized and on whether or not the other region participates in 
international mitigation. Please note that in Figure 1 we only depict net fairness adjustments 
for clarity of presentation.  For the developing region this implies, for example, that fairness 
adjustments affect the pay-off matrix only in case of participation while, fairness adjustments 
in case of non-participation are set equal to zero.  
Developing region  
Overall fairness adjustments in the case of developing countries are given by 
    
           
         
    if the developing region unilaterally participates in the 
climate agreement.   
  can be interpreted as the discomfort of   from having been and 
still being treated in an unfair way.  9 
 
    
         
         
   in case of mutual participation and contribution to climate 
protection.   
  
  and   
  both contain two components: 
Intention driven fairness adjustment component 
For the developing region, this component is reflected by       
   0  in the situation of 
unilateral cooperation and      
   0   in case of mutual cooperation. It is assumed – 
following Camerer and Thaler (2003) – that the negative fairness adjustment (‘negative 
reciprocity’) arising in case of non-cooperation of region R is stronger than the positive 
fairness effect (‘positive reciprocity’) in case of mutual participation (     
         
  ). 
We furthermore assume that a rise in intention driven fairness (decline of   
 ) as perceived 
by developing countries induces an increase in cooperative fairness benefits and mitigates 
the unfairness cost in case of unilateral participation, since the opponent, i.e. the 
industrialized world, is generally perceived to become more kind (i.e. 
   
   
   0  and  
   
   
   
0). 
Consequence driven fairness adjustment component 
As Messner et al. (2010) remark, “in accordance with the polluter-pays principle, the 
industrialized countries have a particular responsibility to cut their greenhouse gas 
emissions due to their high cumulative emissions in the past”. Developing countries not 
only share this view in principle but even tend to the poor losers principle allowing for 
exemption due to low GDP levels (Lange, Vogt and Ziegler 2007). Therefore they often 
perceive their own contributions to mitigation as unfair per se. In line with this, Messner et 
al. (2010) conclude that unless the industrialized countries act according to their particular 
responsibility, “hardly any global climate treaty will ever be achieved.” In line with this 
reasoning, we assume that developing countries’ payoffs are adjusted negatively whenever 
they participate in international mitigation agreements. Additionally, developing countries 
regard a situation in which industrialized countries do not participate while developing 
countries do to be even more unfair than a situation of mutual participation       
   
     
   0    with 
   
   
  ,
   
   
   0   .  
It becomes immediately apparent, that the consequence driven fairness adjustment 
reinforces the tendency for negative reciprocity in the case of unilateral participation of the 10 
 
developing region, while it mitigates positive reciprocity in the case of mutual 
cooperation. 
Industrialized region 
For the industrialized region, we equivalently consider intention and consequence driven 
fairness by separate terms.  
Intention driven fairness adjustment component 
As the perception of intention driven fairness solely depends on whether or not the other 
agent participates in the agreement, we assume that the same mechanisms work in the 
industrialized and developing world. That is, we assume      
          
    to hold.  
Consequence driven fairness adjustment component 
Due to high past emission levels in the industrialized world it is conceivable that 
industrialized countries hold some sense of guilt and they themselves might consider their 
non-participation in international climate change mitigation as unfair. Therefore, we 
include consequence driven fairness terms,      
   and      
  , in the payoff functions 
of the industrialized region when it defects, i.e. plays ‘no participation’.
4 These terms 
reduce the attractiveness of ‘no participation’ from this region’s point of view. If the 
industrialized world conducted policies that help to reduce their feeling of guilt, i.e. that 
reduce the consequences of past unfairness,      
   and      
   would decline, which – 
in turn – raises the attractiveness of ‘no participation’, i.e. the industrialized region is more 
likely to take a free ride in international climate change mitigation. Regarding the level 
guilt perceived, it seems straightforward to assume that unilaterally playing ‘no 
participation’ is associated with higher unfairness adjustment than mutual defection 
(     
         
  ).  
From Figure 1, we can easily see that we still face a chicken game if the following relations 
hold for the industrialized region      
         
            and       
         
    
          and for the developing region      
         
              and       
   
                                                            
4 The ‘veil of uncertainty’ also plays a role in negotiations of regimes as Young (1989) discusses on the basis of 
the earlier works by Rawls (1971) and Brennan and Buchanan (1985). In line with this, we could argue that 
industrialized countries might – due to the long-term scope and generality of an international climate regime – 
be uncertain about the impact of different alternatives on their own future well-being. Then they “tend to agree 
on arrangements that might be called ‘fair’” and the “uncertainty introduced in any choice among rules or 
institutions serves the salutary function of making potential agreement more rather than less likely” (Brennan 
and Buchanan 1985).   11 
 
     
             . In this case we face a chicken game with and without fairness 
adjustments. Thus, in both games the Nash equilibria with pure strategies are (no 
participation, participation) and (participation, no participation).  
As long as there are uncertainties prevailing with respect to the participation of other 
countries, mixed strategies become relevant. In this case, policymakers of the individual 
countries estimate probabilities about the counterparts’ behaviour and make their decisions 
based on these estimates and the corresponding expected payoffs. Country group R estimates 
the likelihoods of country group P’s participation (  ) and non-participation (1    ) – and 
conversely country group P estimates respective likelihoods for country group R (   and 
1    ). For the mixed strategy in the game described by Figure 1, the developing region is 
indifferent between playing ‘participation’ and ‘no participation’ if  
    
     1 
           
        
  
           
         
   
  
 (1) 
holds for the industrialized region’s probability of participation. If   conjectures that the rich 
region plays ‘participation’ with a probability exceeding this threshold, then it will play ‘no 
participation’ in the chicken game setting. Hence, the higher the threshold in (1), the higher is 
the probability that the developing region will participate in international mitigation efforts.  
Equivalently, the industrialized region is indifferent between its two strategies if   
    
     1 
           
         
  
           
         
   
  
. (2) 
From (1) and (2) it can easily be seen that intention driven fairness affects the threshold 
probabilities of the industrialized and the developing region in the same way – as was to be 
expected as intention driven effects arise symmetrically in the two regions. With respect to 
consequence driven fairness, however, its effects on   
  and   
  are exactly opposite. Negative 
fairness effects arise for the industrialized region (due to the feeling of guilt) if the region 
does not participate while they arise for the developing country (due to resentment) in case 
that the region participates.  
The interesting question that follows from (1) and (2) is now how fairness considerations 
affect the likelihood of cooperative behavior in the two regions. Obviously, the two regions 
will react qualitatively in the same way to changes of intention driven fairness perception 
while changes in consequence driven fairness perception will induce contrary reactions. In 12 
 
order to simplify the presentation we will in the following focus on the developing region’s 
reactions while bearing the corresponding reactions of the industrialized region in mind. 
 
3.2 Comparative Statics of Fairness Perception 
To analyze the influence of intention and consequence driven fairness on the likelihood of 
cooperative behavior of the developing region, we derive 
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    0 .   (4) 
where the terms in brackets in the fractions on the right-hand sides are positive in case of a 
chicken game. 
With respect to an increase in historical or consequence driven fairness as perceived by the 
developing region (decrease in   
 ), it can easily be seen that cooperation of the this region 
becomes more likely since the threshold probability rises. This is straightforward as the pay-
offs which the developing region obtains when it participates, increase following a decrease 
in perceived historical unfairness.  
On as first glance, the effects of a change in intention driven fairness look slightly more 
complex as the direction of fairness adjustment depends on the participation decision of the 
other region: unfairness costs arise in the case of unilateral participation while fairness 
benefits follow from mutual cooperation. As, however, a rise in intention driven fairness 
reduces unfairness costs while simultaneously fairness benefits from mutual cooperation 
increase, the likelihood of cooperation also rises in a chicken game following an 
augmentation of intention driven fairness.   
 
3.3 The General Role of Consequence Driven Fairness Perception  
So far, we have assumed that international negotiations on climate change mitigation take the 
form of a chicken game. We justified this assumption by arguing that this approach is 
followed quite often in the literature. Yet, some authors also employ, for example, a 
prisoners’ dilemma (PD) game in which ‘no participation’ is the dominant strategy. In order 
to integrate these dissenting views about the game’s pay-off structure and thus be able 13 
 
analyze the influence of fairness perception more generally, we now abandon our initial 
assumption of a chicken game situation and also consider PD and stag hunt games.   
A PD game differs from the chicken setting with respect to the ratio between payoffs of 
unilateral participation and mutual defection. While  
               
         
     (5) 
holds in the chicken situation, in the PD setting  
               
         
      (6) 
holds instead. It is apparent that the level of consequence driven or historical fairness 
adjustment could make the difference between both game situations.
5 A decline in   
  would 
raise the right-hand side of (6) and the situation may change so that we obtain (5), i.e. the 
dominance of the ‘no participation’ strategy may break down such that cooperative behavior 
becomes more likely. Consequently, in both the PD and the chicken game setting, a rise in 
consequence driven fairness tends to improve the prospect of cooperative behavior of the 
developing region.  
However, the most positive effect could occur in a situation where very strong intention 
driven fairness adjustment takes place, i.e. where   
  is very large. In such a situation the 
game may turn into a coordination game of the stag-hunt type, where the Nash equilibria with 
pure strategies are (no participation, no participation) and (participation, participation) which 
is an outcome of the (negative and positive) reciprocity effects of intention driven fairness 
adjustment. From the developing region’s perspective, (6) and  
                 
         
     (7) 
hold in the stag-hunt case. Given this pay-off structure, a rise in consequence driven fairness 
might induce the dominance of ‘participation’ strategy. A decline in   
  would raise positive 
reciprocity in case of mutual cooperation but mitigate negative reciprocity in case of 
unilateral cooperation. It could happen that the ratio between both sides of (7) reverses, which 
implies that ‘participation’ becomes the dominant strategy. Hence, while intention driven 
fairness adjustment tends to make both, mutual non-cooperation and mutual cooperation, 
more likely, consequence driven fairness adjustment tends to reduce the likelihood of 
cooperation when past activities of opponents (and related consequences) are considered to 
                                                            
5 For a discussion of transitions in structures of games depicting negotiations on climate change, see also Pittel 
and Rübbelke (2011). 14 
 
be unfair but tends to augment the likelihood of cooperation when consequence driven 
fairness is increased. 
 
4.  Support of Climate Policy in Developing Countries 
Industrialized countries could positively influence fairness perception in developing countries 
by supporting them in climate policy. The improved fairness perception in poor countries 
could in turn improve the prospects of success of international negotiations on climate change 
mitigation. Yet, the support might also reduce unfairness cost in the industrialized world, 
which tends to exert a negative influence on industrialized countries’ readiness to contribute 
to international mitigation. Let us distinguish between different kinds of support and between 
influences on intention driven fairness on the one hand side and consequence driven fairness 
on the other hand side.     
 
4.1 Support of Mitigation 
Industrialized countries support developing countries in climate policy by providing 
conditional transfers for climate change mitigation in these countries. The Global 
Environmental Facility (GEF) serves as the financial mechanism under the UNFCCC which 
collects funds from industrialized countries and channels these towards climate protection 
projects in the developing world. Next, it is considered how these transfers might improve 
fairness perceived in the developing world, but also reasons for moral concerns brought about 
with respect to this support are regarded. 
Industrialized countries’ subsidization of mitigation in the developing world might be 
interpreted as a means to improve intention driven fairness (which is reflected by a decline of 
  
  ),
6  since it signals – not unlike industrialized countries’ commitments to domestic 
mitigation efforts under an international protocol – a preparedness of industrialized countries 
to invest in climate protection. Put it differently, the ostensive sense of responsibility of the 
industrialized world tends to raise the level of kindness the developing world assigns to the 
rich countries. Unfortunately, the induced benefits of mitigation support will arise only in 
distant future, which is due to the thermal inertia of the global system. Furthermore, the 
prevailing self-interest of industrialized countries in the cost-effective ‘purchase of 
                                                            
6 The degree of fairness improvement depends on the level of the subsidy rate and the induced benefits in the 
industrialized and developing world. On the influence of the subsidy rate level on the welfare level in the 
supported developing country see Rive and Rübbelke (2010) who consider conditional transfers channeled 
through the Clean Development Mechanism.  15 
 
abatement’ in developing countries via mitigation support might impair the credibility of such 
activities to be based on kindness (although the abatement support is not credited for potential 
commitments of industrialized countries in an international protocol, as would be the case 
with respect to efforts associated with the Clean Development Mechanism). Since – due to 
the public good property of climate change mitigation and the lower mitigation cost in the 
developing world – industrialized countries also benefit from mitigation in developing 
countries, poor countries might not consider the mitigation support as a signal of rich 
countries for playing ‘fair’. And unfair background conditions for interaction between poor 
and rich countries may constitute moral concerns, as they influence the conditions for 
granting and accepting international transfers dedicated to the support of mitigation (see 
Eyckmans and Kverndokk 2010 who allude to the potential role of unfair background 
conditions in the context of pollution permits trading).  
Next, we turn to consequence driven fairness aspects (influencing the level of   
 ) induced by 
respective international transfers. In doing so, let us distinguish between two major strands of 
mitigation policies, i.e. between GHG abatement and carbon sequestration, and between two 
different aspects, i.e. between compensating for past emissions and compensating for damage 
cost caused by past emissions. 
  Compensating for past emissions: Past emissions cannot be removed anymore by 
abatement activities and consequently, negative consequences of past GHG emissions are 
unaffected by a rise in abatement efforts. In contrast, mitigation activities in the shape of 
carbon sequestration (e.g. by means of reforestation projects) would indeed reduce the 
negative consequences of past emissions since a part of the latter is removed by the carbon 
uptake by forests. Hence, while the commitment to abatement support tends to affect only 
intention driven fairness perception in the developing world, carbon sequestration support 
would – in principle – also serve consequence driven fairness improvement (and may 
hence reduce the level of   
 ). 
  Compensating for damage cost caused by past emissions: If we take into account that 
mitigation activities in the developing world are regularly associated with the generation 
of significant domestic ancillary benefits in the mitigation project hosting country (e.g. 
improved air pollution, preservation of water availability, prevention of desertification; see 
Pittel and Rübbelke 2008), these benefits could be interpreted as a kind of compensation 
payment for climate change damage mainly caused by the industrialized world. Hence, 16 
 
consequence driven fairness aspects might be affected - via ancillary benefits - by both 
abatement and sequestration support policies (reducing the level of   
 ). 
We are aware of the fact that these aspects only gather a small array of possible views on 
fairness. Plenty of further (un-)fairness arguments and aspects might be cited in the context of 
international mitigation support provided by the UNFCCC’s financial mechanism. However, 
the selected array allowed for an ostensive illustration of the general differences between 
consequence driven and intention driven fairness influences exerted by the international 
support.  
Above all, it seems to be unlikely that negotiators in international climate policy will consider 
and evaluate all particular fairness influences and aspects in detail in order to derive 
ubiquitous equity principles they intend to support. Instead, their beliefs about equity will 
probably be based on more narrow views which exclude several aspects. As Breton and 
Dalmazzone (2002: 46) point out: “It is costly to ascertain objectively the different states of 
the world. To minimize these costs, individuals form beliefs over those states of the world 
that are of relevance to them. These beliefs then serve as a basis for making decisions.” And 
as Akerlof and Dickens (1982: 307) explain, agents can manipulate their own beliefs by 
selecting sources of information, which tend to confirm desired beliefs. This might explain 
why Lange et al. (2010) find that perceived support of different equity rules is generally 
consistent with economic self-interest. Negotiators in international climate policy tend to a 
big extent to advocate those equity principles which bring about the highest benefit for their 
country and they select their beliefs about equity and justice accordingly. Hence, it is idle to 
search for the universal fairness principle from a normative perspective, but in international 
negotiations it might make more sense to seek a consensus about equity rules between 
negotiators, which might – however – be strongly affected by self-interests.  
Implicitly, such a consensus had been found in the past, when the main responsibility for 
mitigation had been assigned to the industrialized world. According to Article 4.3 of the 
UNFCCC, developed countries shall provide new and additional financial resources and 
transfer of technology needed by developing countries to meet the agreed full incremental 
costs of measures undertaken by developing countries in favor of the global environment. 
And as Baron (2006: 137-138) remarks, the negotiations leading to the Kyoto Protocol “have 
focused largely on the problem of fairness in allocating the burden among nations, with major 
issues concerning the balance of prior causation and ability to pay, and the extent to which 
countries can fulfill their obligations by paying for emission reductions in other countries.” 17 
 
Hence, international mitigation support may be seen by developing countries as a norm which 
was agreed upon in the past, and a deviation from it would be considered to be unfair. 
However, since the time when the UNFCCC was agreed, there have been major shifts in the 
GHG emission patterns internationally and new consensus about an appropriate equity 




Adaptation support can also influence both the intention driven fairness (via a modification in 
the level of   
  ) and the consequence driven fairness (via a change in   
 ) adjustment. 
Adaptation activities preventing climate change damage in the developing world tend to raise 
consequence driven fairness perception. However, additional to these effects, the procedures 
for granting adaptation support might also influence intention driven fairness perception. Let 
us illustrate this by means of two examples: 
Global benefit orientation vs. no predefinition of the nature of benefits  
One track used by the GEF to provide adaptation support is the Strategic Priority “Piloting an 
Operational Approach to Adaptation” (SPA), which has been a part of the GEF Trust Fund.
8 
These funds were granted with global benefit orientation, i.e. developing and industrialized 
countries benefited from the induced adaptation activities. The transfers will help to prevent 
damage in poor countries caused by past emissions (which stem mainly from industrialized 
countries) and therefore may reconstitute some of the consequence driven fairness perceived 
in developing countries (i.e. they will cause a decrease in   
 ). Such prevention of damage in 
poor countries could also be generated by means of adaptation support not mainly aiming at 
global benefits, i.e. where the nature of benefits is not predefined. Consequently, both the 
global benefit oriented support as well as the support without global benefit focus, improve 
consequence driven fairness perception (and therefore decrease the level of   
 ).   
However, support with global benefit orientation may evoke the impression that 
industrialized countries provide the support only because they have themselves an interest in 
induced adaptation activities and benefits. Therefore it exhibits some similarities to 
mitigation support. If the industrialized countries would instead abstain from the requirement 
                                                            
7 As Müller (2001: 285-286) states, “the general architecture of the regime under the UNFCCC should not 
involve fixing legally binding distribution formulae for all eternity […]. Like everything in the world, moral 
contexts are likely to change and what is fair in the present state of affairs may well be unfair under the as yet 
unknown – and even unforeseen – circumstances in fifty, one hundred, or a thousand years time.” 
8 By September 2009, all SPA funding had been allocated. 18 
 
that supported adaptation projects should produce global benefits, this would generate the 
signal that the industrialized world is willing to help the poor countries regardless of own 
advantages, which is in turn a stronger signal for the willingness to play fair in international 
climate policy,
9 i.e. intention driven fairness perceived in developing countries is raised (and 
thus the level of   
  alters). Or as Kydd (2000: 326) puts it: “Trust is conceived of as a belief 
that the other side is likely to be trustworthy and will therefore want to reciprocate 
cooperation rather than exploit it. Costly signals serve to separate the trustworthy types from 
the untrustworthy types; trustworthy types will send them, untrustworthy types will find them 
too risky to send”.
10  This implies that the high net-cost option of supporting adaptation 
projects producing only local benefits in the developing world, may amplify trust of the poor 
countries in a better way than the support of adaptation producing global utility which also 
benefits the industrialized world and thereby decreases its net cost. 
Indeed, the other GEF-managed adaptation funds, i.e. the Least Developed Countries Fund 
(LDCF) and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), are not managed with global benefit 
orientation. This is not only advantageous from an intention driven fairness perspective, but it 
is also more operational, since the benefits of most adaptation activities are largely local or 
regional (and not global). 
Participation of developing countries in the management of support mechanisms 
A positive effect on intention driven fairness-perception could be generated by organizing the 
international adaptation support in a way that allows for strong participation of developing 
countries in the management of support mechanisms. A strong participation will raise the 
confidence of developing countries that funds are disbursed in a way that they consider to be 
most beneficial for themselves and which, therefore, apparently – from the developing 
countries’ policymakers’ point of view – compensates them for (perceived) unfairness to the 
largest extent. Consequently,   
  tends to shrink, but also intention driven fairness is affected, 
since a more equitable approach in individual areas of international climate policy may also 
signal kind intentions of the industrialized world in negotiations on mitigation (i.e. which is 
reflected by a decrease in   
 ). 
                                                            
9 As Paavola and Adger (2005: 360) state, “[w]hen agents have plural motivations – of which self-centred 
welfare maximisation is but one example – and their ability to detect the motivations of other agents is limited, 
then the act of signalling intentions becomes a means to elicit reciprocal behaviour.” 
10 Also see Parks and Roberts (2008) for this line of reasoning. 19 
 
A strong participation is destined, for example, with respect to the management of the 
Adaptation Fund (AF) which falls under the framework of the Kyoto Protocol and is 
managed and supervised by a special Adaptation Fund Board.
11 Developing countries hold 
the overall majority of seats in the AF Board. In contrast, the GEF-lead management of 
adaptation funds (as in the case of LDCF and SCCF) is considered with scepticism in many 
developing countries, because the GEF’s governance and agenda is regarded as dominated by 
the industrialized world (see, e.g., Najam, Huq and Sokona 2003: 225). The role of 
developing countries with respect to the Green Climate Fund (GCF), whose establishment 
had been decided at the COP in Cancun and which will become a major international 
mechanism for adaptation and mitigation support, is currently intensively discussed (see, e.g. 
Bird, Brown and Schalatek 2011). The GCF Board, which will govern the Fund, will 
comprise an equal number of members from industrialized and developing countries 
(UNFCCC 2011). 
Yet, given significant governance problems in several developing countries, some of the 
delegated climate negotiators’ of these developing countries may not agree that those 
adaptation options are most beneficial which effectively generate the highest climate change 
damage cost reduction. Instead they may pursue strategies maximizing their own personal 
wellbeing and not the welfare of their entire country. Hence, a strong participation of 
developing countries in the management of international adaptation funds does not guarantee 
a maximal positive effect of the disbursement of adaptation funds on consequence driven 
fairness perception within developing countries, although it looks attractive from intention 
driven fairness perspective. 
 
5.  Conclusions  
There is much ambiguity with respect to fairness, equity and justice dimensions of 
international climate policy. What an agent in international negotiations “regards as a fair 
bargain depends on several factors: who the actor is, who the other negotiating parties are, 
and the forum in which negotiations are taking place” (Narlikar 2006: 1005). As experimental 
evidence shows, agents tend to be influenced by their perception of (un-)fairness. 
Consequently, decisions of negotiators representing their country in the international climate 
policy arena tend to be influenced by fairness perceptions which are based on their individual 
                                                            
11 For an application of different fairness and equity criteria to evaluate the Adaptation Fund, see Grasso (2010). 20 
 
country’s circumstances and these circumstances (or factors) differ significantly among 
countries. 
Thus, it does not only make much sense to include fairness adjustments in the modelling of 
international negotiations, but also to investigate how fairness adjustment can be changed in a 
way that facilitates the attainment of an optimal outcome. International support of climate 
policy tends to be an attractive tool for this purpose. Adaptation support, for example, could 
help to correct for perceived unfairness associated with the unequal distribution of individual 
countries’ past contributions to global warming. By preventing – via adaptation support – that 
damage costs caused by past emissions materialize in developing countries, these countries’ 
perception of consequence driven (or historical) unfairness could be decreased. Intention 
driven fairness could be improved by kind behaviour in the present climate policy arena. This 
concept of fairness is closely related to the concept of procedural fairness. If processes in 
international climate policy are regarded as ‘fair’ (which might e.g. be the case when the 
involvement of all relevant parties in these processes is provided for), then the trust between 
countries tends to increase and therefore intention driven fairness is improved. This implies a 
decreasing degree of negative reciprocity and a rising degree of positive reciprocity, making 
mutual international cooperation in climate protection more likely 
In our game-theoretic analysis, fairness concepts do not stipulate but influence the outcomes 
of international climate policy. We described possible interactions between the different 
fairness concepts and demonstrated how fairness improvement might change game structures. 
By referring to the game theoretic analysis, we elaborated the influence international support 
schemes launched in the past, tend to have on fairness. As we observed, these schemes have 
not yet fully taken fairness aspects into account, although fairness tends to facilitate the 
attainment of an effective international climate protection.  
There may be several reasons for this seemingly suboptimal level of fairness-generating 
efforts, e.g. it might be due to a trade-off between fairness-goals and the material wellbeing 
of transfer providing countries. As we remarked, effective signals for playing ‘fair’ might be 
costly in material terms and transfer providing countries will balance cost and benefits of 
fairness-generating policies. Industrialized countries might also hesitate to more strongly 
pursue fairness enhancement via climate policy support mechanisms, because they distrust 
policymakers of individual developing countries and fear that resources might be wasted by 
these policymakers if they get too easily access to support funds. Such distrust could be 
reflected by an assignment of the majority of seats in the governing bodies of international 21 
 
support funds to industrialized countries. It might therefore be an indication for currently 
rising trust levels (on the industrialized countries’ side) that the majority of the members of 
the Transitional Committee assigned to design the Green Climate Fund is from the 
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